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Abstract 
Using a sample of UK mergers and acquisitions from 1985-2004, we show that equity 
over-valuation appears to play an important role in the determination of financing 
method.  Our results are broadly consistent with those theories based upon market 
over-valuation driving mergers and their financing, rather than a Q-theory 
explanation.  In some contrast to the US results of Dong et al (2006) we find that 
proxies for over-valuation appear to be the more persuasive explanation for 
acquisition financing behaviour in the UK.  Given the evidence in favour of valuation 
effects, we argue that a treatment effects model is necessary in investigating the long 
run performance of acquirers.  Taken together with results from a univariate analysis, 
such a model reveals some modest support for the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) 
hypothesis.  
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Stock market driven acquisitions versus the Q theory of 
takeovers – The UK evidence 
 
One of the more interesting theories to emerge from behavioural finance theorists in 
recent years has been that of market timing.  Loughran and Ritter (2000) advance a 
theory of what they term “behavioural timing” which suggests that managers may 
seek to exploit perceived misvaluations of their firm’s stock.  This exploitation could, 
for example, take the form of issuing either equity or debt depending on perceived 
relative cheapness, or timing the decision to launch an initial public offering (IPO).  
Baker and Wurgler (2002) show that the financing structure of firms appears to be the 
result of past attempts to time the market.  Shleifer and Vishny (2003) extend this 
market timing idea to suggest that firms make stock-financed acquisitions when their 
equity is highly valued, and in particular when it is more highly valued than the 
target’s stock.  Underlying all of these theories is the notion that management 
perceives the firm’s stock to be misvalued by an inefficient market, and responds 
accordingly.  In each case, they will be acting rationally and in the interests of existing 
stockholders, but at the expense of either new stockholders or new debtholders.  For 
example, Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Baker and Wurgler (2000) show that stock 
returns are low following the issue of equity, and it is well-documented that stock 
returns are low following equity-financed acquisitions (Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000; 
Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker, 1995; Gregory, 1997; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Rau 
and Vermaelen, 1998).  A refinement of the theory of over-valuation driving mergers 
is found in Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004, henceforth RKV) where both 
bidders and targets have private information about the stand-alone values of their 
firms, but valuations have market-wide and firm-specific components.  Furthermore, 
the combination of these misvaluation effects means that the target cannot assess the 
true value of any synergies.  A key difference between the Shleifer and Vishny (2003, 
henceforth SV) and RKV models is that the latter assumes that target management 
acts rationally and in the interests of the shareholders, whereas in the SV model target 




Our focus in this paper is on the acquisition decision in the UK.  SV point out that a 
management team in an over-valued company that pursues a stock-financed 
acquisition of a less over-valued target could be acting rationally, in that although 
stock returns will be low following the acquisition, they will nonetheless be higher 
than they would have been had management taken no action
1
.  In fact this will only be 
the case if management pursue an otherwise successful post acquisition strategy.  The 
somewhat mixed evidence from cash-financed acquisitions (e.g. Agrawal and Jaffe, 
2000) does not suggest that this can be entirely relied upon, for the UK at least.  
Furthermore, there are alternative actions available to management in the case where 
stock is over-valued.  They could, for example, simply issue equity, either to finance 
future investment or to retire debt.  This is potentially an important issue in framing 
the research design to address the Shleifer and Vishny hypothesis.  If one takes the 
view that an equity financed acquisition is the only way to exploit a perceived over-
valuation of stock, compared to an alternative of doing nothing, then the best research 
design is to compare a sample of stock-financing acquirers with a matched sample of 
equivalently-valued but non-acquiring firms.  This design is found in Ang and Cheng 
(2006).  In effect, the model employed assumes that the decision to acquire is 
endogenous, and simply the result of a market misvaluation that has arisen.  An 
alternative view is that the decision to acquire a firm is exogenous, and that it is the 
financing method, or possibly the timing of the takeover, that is endogenous to the 
misvaluation of the equity.  If one takes this second view, then the appropriate 
research design involves studying acquiring companies, their financing choices, and 
the stock market performance following the acquisition decision.  This is the type of 
research design employed by Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh (2006) and is 
also the design followed here.  Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) also 
study the set of bidding firms, but using a decomposition of market-to-book ratio 
approach.  A recent paper by Savor and Lu (2009) attempts a third approach, namely 
comparing successful equity-financed bids with those that fail for what they regard as 
exogenous reasons.   
 
In complete contrast to the market valuation models of mergers, under the Q-
hypothesis of acquisitions as described in Dong et al (2006), firms are highly valued 
                                                 
1
 The RKV model leads to a similar prediction.   
 4 
because they are well-run and have high NPV opportunities.  Market values simply 
reflect growth opportunities and managerial ability.  There is no particular reason for 
high-Q firms to prefer equity financing, although as Dong et al (2006, p.753) note, 
bidders with strong growth opportunities may prefer to preserve cash or keep gearing 
low in order to fund opportunities in the future.  However, a critical difference 
between Q-theory and the valuation theories of mergers is that long run stock returns 
should be either positively related to, or unrelated to
2
 Q irrespective of the form of 
financing, whereas under the SV hypothesis long run stock-returns will be negative 
for equity financed acquisitions, but not for cash-financed ones. 
 
We study the UK market for two reasons.  First, there is the usual (though nonetheless 
important) case for an out of sample test of the SV/RKV and Q hypotheses.  If market 
valuation effects drive acquisitions and their financing, then ceteris paribus, one 
should find the effect exists in markets outside the US.  However, markets have 
different ownership structures.  For example, Andre and Ben-Amar (2008) describe 
Canada as having highly concentrated ownership with dominant family shareholdings, 
whilst Gregory and Matatko (2005, Table 1) discuss the very different ownership 
structure that prevailed in US and UK markets between 1975-1995, noting that “The 
relative unimportance of individual investors in the UK throughout the sample period 
means that there is less likely to be an emphasis on cash as a form of payment in 
acquisitions”.  In terms of concentration of ownership, Stapledon and Bates (2002, 
Table 2) show  that the top twenty UK fund managers controlled 37.06% of the UK 
market by value as at the end of 1997, with the top three alone controlling just under 
11%. Such concentration may mean that, to some degree at least, target shareholders 
are less likely to have the motivations claimed by SV, and may also be less likely to 
suffer from the information asymmetry that drives the RKV theory.  In a concentrated 
market, we would also expect these fund managers to have a greater chance of 
identifying the market, sector and firm specific components of misvaluation identified 
in RKV.  In short, there are reasons to suppose that stock market valuation effects on 




                                                 
2
 Unrelated as if markets are efficient the reaction takes place on announcement. 
3
 However, note that Gregory (2000) finds no evidence that institutional shareholdings have an 
influence in determining the form of financing. 
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The paper now proceeds as follows.  First, we describe the specific SV hypotheses 
that we set out to test, and contrast these with the predictions of Q-theory.  Second, we 
describe the data set and the research method.  Third, we show how, using simple 
univariate tests, the data seem to be consistent with valuation effects influencing the 
form of payment.  Fourth, we examine whether the pre-bid and announcement period 
returns differ between equity financed acquisitions, and compare post-bid returns for 
equity and cash acquirers.  We also examine whether relatively highly valued equity 
acquirers perform differently than relatively lowly-valued equity acquirers.  We then 
go on to show that in a logit model which controls for factors that have been shown to 
influence the form of payment in UK studies, our proxies for valuation have a 
significant role to play in predicting the choice of financing method.    
 
Finally, having shown that our proxies for valuation influence financing choice, we 
argue that the correct analysis of announcement period and longer-term performance 
requires that a treatment effects model is employed.  We estimate such a model and 
show that once the effect of valuation on financing choice is taken into account, there 
is at least some modest evidence to support the conjecture that equity financing 
acquirers seem to be acting in the interests of their shareholders. 
 
Hypothesis Development 
SV (p.297) set out a number of predictions that arise from their model.  We contrast 
these with those of Q-theory, explain which of these predictions we are able to test, 
and formalise hypotheses based on those predictions where appropriate.  The specific 
predictions SV make are as follows: 
  
(1) acquisitions are disproportionately for stock when aggregate or industry 
valuations are high.  Q-theory is silent on this issue.  We test this insofar as it related 
to aggregate (but not industry) market conditions.  Specifically, the hypothesis we test 
is: 





(2) the volume of stock acquisitions increases with the dispersion of valuations 
amongst firms. Q-theory makes no predictions in relation to this prediction, and we do 
not investigate this as it would require tests based on merger waves, which are beyond 
the scope of this paper.   
 
(3) targets in cash acquisitions earn low prior returns, whereas bidders in stock 
acquisitions earn high prior returns.  Whilst Q-theory has nothing to say about prior 
returns, the fact that inefficient targets (which would have under-performed) get 
acquired by more efficient bidders would be consistent with the theory’s predictions.  
The critical difference is that under Q-theory there would be no reason to expect 
differences in prior returns conditional on the form of financing.  The SV hypotheses 
we test in relation to this conjecture are: 
 
H2: Acquirers in equity financed acquisitions will have positive pre-bid 
returns; 
H3: Targets in cash-financed acquisitions will have negative pre-bid abnormal 
returns. 
 
(4) bidders in stock acquisitions exhibit signs of over-valuation. This prediction 
implies that there are differences between the valuation ratios observed in cash 
financed bids and equity financed bids.  We have two testable hypotheses that derive 
from this: 
H4: Valuation ratios of acquirers will be higher in the case of equity-financed 
bids than cash bids; 
H5: the valuation ratio of the acquirer will increase the probability of an 
equity-financed bid. 
Under Q-theory, acquirers as a whole may be highly valued, as they are more 
efficiently managed and have superior investment opportunity sets, but we would 
expect no differences in valuations that vary with the form of financing chosen, so 
that the predictions from Q-theory are simply the nulls of H4 and H5. 
 
(5) long-run returns are likely to be negative in stock acquisitions, and positive in 
cash acquisitions. This follows from the conjecture that stock-financing acquirers are 
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over-valued, whilst cash acquirers are not, but nonetheless that both firms act in the 
long run interests of their shareholders.  This leads to two simple hypotheses: 
H6: long run returns will be negative for equity financed acquisitions; 
H7: long run returns will be positive for cash financed acquisitions. 
Note that under Q-theory, market efficiency arguments suggest that no long run 
abnormal returns should be observed in either case – strictly all abnormal returns 
should be observed on announcement, and such abnormal returns should be non-
negative.  However, to the extent that any long run returns are observed, they should 
be non-negative and should exhibit no differences that vary with the form of 
financing, so the Q-theory hypothesis would be the null of H6. 
 
(6) despite these negative long run returns, acquisitions for stock serve the long terms 
interests of the acquirer. This is because the acquiring firms successfully exploits its 
over-valued share price to buy less over-valued assets. In the strictest sense SV’s sixth 
prediction is untestable, as it requires an unobservable counter-factual.  Of course, one 
can come up with proxies for this, as the papers we discuss above attempt, but all such 
attempts suffer from the problem of endogeneity.  As Savor and Lu (2009) note in the 
context of failed bids, it is essential that the reason for the bid failing is wholly 
unrelated to the bidder’s valuation.  Their proxies are a sub-sample of non-hostile bids 
that fail because of “regulatory disapproval (mostly antitrust action), subsequent 
competing offers, or unexpected target developments”.  However, it is arguable that 
failure because of a competing bid is not necessarily exogenous to the original 
bidder’s valuation.  Because of this difficulty of finding proxies that are truly 
exogenous (and indeed the difficulty posed by the likely small sample of such 
acquirers), we employ a different approach when investigating the sixth SV 
prediction, and employ a treatment regression to test our eighth hypothesis: 
H8: Once the influence of mis-valuation, or relative mis-valuation, of the 
acquirer is allowed for, the effects of stock-financing on long run bidder 
returns will be mitigated. 
 
(7) acquiring a firm in another industry may yield higher long run returns than one in 
a related industry. This leads directly to a simple hypothesis: 




(8) management resistance to some cash tender offers is in the interests of 
shareholders, and;  
(9) management of targets either have relatively short horizons or are effectively 
“bought off” for agreeing to the deal.   
We do not attempt to test (8) and (9), partly because of the difficulty of determining 
“resistance” (see Schwert, 2000) and partly because we cannot observe either the 
personal pay-off or the time horizon of target managers.   
 
Later in the paper, SV note that their model suggests that:  
(10) a more highly valued acquirer only makes a cash bid if the target is under-valued 
even at the bid price (p.305), i.e. that it is absolutely under-valued (p. 308).  This 
leads directly to two hypotheses: 
H10: Targets will be under-valued in absolute terms in the case of cash bids; 
H11: the valuation ratio of the target will decrease the probability of a cash 
financed bid. 
But by contrast: 
(11) targets in stock acquisitions are undervalued relative to the acquirer (p.308). 
This gives rise to the following hypotheses:  
H12: Valuation ratios of acquirers will be higher than those of targets in the 
case of equity-financed bids; 
H13: the relative valuation of the acquirer to the target will increase the 
probability of an equity financed bid. 
 
Under the SV hypothesis, the only rational equity bidders are those that exploit their 
relative over-valuation.  However, as their prediction (in [6] above) is that those firms 
which issue equity and are relatively over-valued compared to their targets are acting 
in the best interests of shareholders, their predictions imply that those firms that issue 
equity and are not relatively over-valued compared to their targets may not be.  This 
leads to our final hypothesis: 
H14: When acquisitions are for equity, bidder returns will be higher in cases 
where the acquirer is relatively over-valued compared to the target. 
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With regard to H10-H14, Q-theory is silent on financing choice, although one might 
invoke Martin’s (1996) risk-sharing hypothesis to explain why highly-valued targets 
get acquired for stock in an efficient market.  Alternatively, one might advance the 
previously described hypothesis in Dong et al (2006).  The two clear predictions from 
Q-theory is that acquirers should have higher Q-ratios than targets, and that returns to 
acquirers should, on average, be either positive or not significantly different from 
zero.   
 
Data and Research Method 
Our sample is mainly drawn from the SDC-Platinum Database (Securities Data 
Company), from 1985 to 2004 (inclusive), but in the early years data are 
supplemented by the use of the Acquisitions Monthly AMDATA database.  We 
require both acquirer and target firms to be UK listed companies on the London Stock 
Exchange, and for their monthly returns to be available on the London Business 
School Share Price Database (LSPD).  The accounting data used in this research come 
from DataStream, with missing values hand-collected where possible from the 
London Stock Exchange Official Year Book. In addition, the market capitalisation data 
are collected from the LSPD.  
 
We classify the sample according to the dominant method of payment.  In this respect, 
it should be noted that there is a key difference between takeovers in the UK and 
takeovers elsewhere.  In the UK, according to The City Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers, a share offer must be accompanied by a cash alternative offer if any shares 
have been purchased in the market for cash during the 12 months preceding the 
merger.  This cash alternative has to be set, as a minimum, at the highest price paid 
for any shares in the market in this period.  In practice, this means that a considerable 
number of UK takeovers are classified as shares and cash by SDC, when the reality is 
that many such takeovers are really stock financed deals with a regulatory cash 
alternative added on.  Cooke, Gregory and Pearson (1994) provide some evidence on 
the generally low take-up of such an alternative.  Accordingly, we use the following 
criteria to classify the method of payment: 
 10 
if the method of payment is 100% cash, or cash with a loan note alternative
4
, 
then it is a cash transaction;  
if the method of payment includes some portion of shares, then it is a share 
transaction; 
any alternative offers are classified as “other”.  
 
The total sample in this research is (initially) 805 acquisitions, with 251 being pure 
cash offers, 501 being share-offers and 53 deals being classified as “other”.   Given 
the paucity of information concerning the structure of the “other” bids
5
, we choose to 
drop these from the analysis and concentrate on the distinction between equity and 
cash bids, which is at the heart of the SV hypothesis.  For our basic tests we require 
accounting data on earnings and book values for both acquirers and targets, in order to 
compute a residual income valuation (RIV), and we require at least the announcement 
month returns to be available for both acquirers and targets which reduces our core 
sample to 669 matched pairs of acquirer and target firms.  In a sensitivity analysis, we 
also investigate two sub-samples for which IBES forecast data is available.  We take 
two cuts of this sub-sample.  Sub-sample 1 (SS1) is that where there is forecast data 
available for at least the acquirer.  This sub-sample consists of 460 matched acquirer 
and target firms.  The second sub-sample, sub-sample 2 (SS2), is that where we 
require analysts’ forecasts to be available for both acquirer and target firms.  This 
allows us to investigate a matched sample of 321 acquirers and targets.   
 
For these samples of firms, we estimate valuation models, as described below, 
together with announcement month and longer term abnormal returns.  Our model for 
abnormal returns is the buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) model, with 
bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistics p-values calculated following Lyon, 
Barber and Tsai (1999).  We report these returns for 12 and 36 months post 
acquisition for acquirers, and for 12 and 36 months pre-acquisition announcement 
month for both acquirers and targets.  Given the evidence in Loughran and Ritter 
(2000) we present results for returns benchmarked against ten size-based control 
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 During the early years of our sample this was a common offer as the loan note alternative was a tax-
efficient form of payment for some private investors. 
5
 Where we are able to fully assess these bids, by cross-referencing to copies of Acquisitions Monthly, 
these typically involve equity like components, such as warrants or convertible loan notes.  




  As in Lyon et al (1999), missing returns for firms lacking a full 36 
months data are filled in with the size benchmark return. 
 
The characteristics of our initial sample are presented in Table 1.  We show acquiring 
firms characterised according to their size and book to market ratio (BTMV).  We use 
deciles for size classification, and quintiles for BTMV classification, with an 
additional group (F) for those firms with negative book-to-market ratios.  One striking 
characteristic from this table is that over one third of all equity financing acquirers are 
in the low (i.e. “glamour”) book to market quintile, with 58% being in the two 
“glamour” quintiles.  Not surprisingly, acquirers tend to be larger firms and this is 
particularly the case for cash acquirers. 
 
We value our acquirers and targets using the residual income valuation (RIV) model 
employed in both Ang and Chen (2006) and Dong et al (2006), which follow the Lee, 
Myers and Swaminathan (1999, henceforth LMS) version of the Peasnell (1982) 
model.
7
  The LMS model requires a consensus analyst forecast of earnings and 
dividends to be available from IBES for three years ahead.  Unfortunately, such 
forecasts are not available for the UK for the full period of our study (they start in 
1987) and are somewhat patchy, and we find a large number of instances where 
forecasts are missing.  UK analysts typically only forecast two years ahead and this is 
reflected in the poor availability of third year forecasts.  We also find many examples 
of missing dividend forecasts.  Were we to rigidly insist on full 3 year forecasts of 
earnings and dividends, our sample would be reduced to less than 150 target firms.  
By contrast, one year ahead forecasts are far more common, and 92% of firms that 
have a one year ahead forecast also have a two year one.
8
  Dividend forecasts are only 
available for 62% of the targets which have earnings forecasts.  Accordingly, we need 
to modify the LMS model somewhat.  As all analysts’ forecasts are in nominal terms, 
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 An earlier version of this paper used both size and size and book to market matching, finding little 
qualitative difference between the model, although abnormal returns tended to be more negative for the 
size-matched BHARs.  However, given our analysis here now reports results partitioned on book to 
market, we simply control for size in calculating BHARs. 
7
 Often rather misleading referred to as the Ohlson (1995) model.  The Ohlson model is a special case 
of the Peasnell model where abnormal earnings are assumed to mean revert according to a particular 
pattern which Ohlson terms a “linear information dynamic”.  In fact, the Lee et al (1999) framework is 
a special case of the Ohlson model where abnormal earnings are assumed to be persistent (ω=1) and 
where the value of Ohlson’s “other information” variable is assumed to be zero. 
8
 Note that even requiring any sort of forecast is not without cost.  As we show later, the subset of firms 
for which forecasts are available exhibit less negative long term abnormal returns than the full sample. 
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we fill in missing forecasts by assuming earnings grow in line with inflation, plus a 
real growth term.  For real growth we take the long run UK average real earnings 
growth figure of 1.6% reported in Gregory (2007).
9
  For missing dividends, we 
assume that the dividend paid is the same as the latest financial year end pre-merger 
dividend.  We could, of course, assume a constant payout rate, but given the evidence 
on “sticky” dividends this is a not unreasonable assumption and, if earnings are rising, 
is more conservative than assuming a constant payout.
10
  The expected long term 
inflation rate (gt) at time t in the UK is calculated by using the difference
11
 between 
the yield on long-dated gilts (the UK equivalent of the long dated Treasury Bond) and 
the yield on long dated index-linked gilts (the UK equivalent of TIPS, which have 
been in existence in the UK since 1984).  Last, we model the growth in long term RI 
using a mean reversion to industry ROE, as in LMS.  We assume that RI declines 
from the end of year three to the end of year seven in a linear fashion, so that earnings 
from year eight to perpetuity are simply the industry ROE multiplied by the clean-
surplus forecasted opening book value for year eight.  We also sensitised our analysis 
by assuming mean reversion occurs over three, rather than eight, years.  As results 
from this are very similar, we do not report the three year mean reversion period 
results.  We could, of course, use longer intervals, but Gebhardt, Lee and 
Swaminathan (2001) show results are similar over horizons ranging from six to 21 
years.  Insofar as acquirers have higher implied forecasted ROEs than targets, 
choosing shorter intervals for mean reversion rather than longer ones means our tests 
of the SV valuation hypotheses are likely to be conservative. 
 
Formally, our model is: 
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 We do not believe that the absence of long run earnings forecasts for the UK should be a particular 
cause for concern. For the UK, Capstaff et al (1995) show that besides exhibiting bias, the consensus 
analyst forecast fails to out-perform a random walk model of earnings at horizons greater than 15 
months.  More generally, using US data Bulkley and Harris (1997) show that analysts’ long run 
earnings forecasts are so biased as to be employable in a successful contrarian investment strategy.   
10
 It is tempting to invoke dividend irrelevance, but whilst this applies in the long term, in the short 
term the assumed dividend has a modest impact on value, as it influences closing book value and hence 
the following periods’ RI. 
11
 (1 + nominal rate)/(1 + index-linked rate) -1 
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FROEit = Forecasted firm i ROE for years 1 to 3, using the fill-in procedure described 
above where analysts’ consensus forecasts are missing, and assuming a five 
year linear fade rate to industry ROE after year 3, as described in LMS. 
kei =     Industry cost of equity, as described below 
Bit =  Equity book value of firm i in year t, estimated by a clean surplus relation 
for all years beyond year t. 
 
In cases where the implied horizon value RI is negative (i.e. if industry ROE is below 
industry cost of capital), we replace the final implied RI term in the expression above 
with zero, so effectively assuming that at the end of the forecast period the firm is 
worth the closing book value implied by the short run earnings and dividend forecasts. 
 
To estimate the above model we need an industry cost of equity capital, kei, and an 
industry average ROE.  Our industries are based upon Datastream classifications and 
are the groupings described in Gregory and Michou (2009, Appendix A).  Our 
industry ROE figures are rolling industry averages from Datastream, where we use up 
to ten years where they are available, but shorter intervals where the full ten years are 
not available.  Our industry cost of capital then uses the industry beta estimates from 
Gregory and Michou (2009, Table 3, Panel A) in a CAPM framework.  We assume 
the expected return on the market is a 5% real rate of return, this being broadly 
consistent with long run estimates of the UK cost of equity given in Dimson, Marsh 
and Staunton (2005), but we also sensitise our models by varying the cost of equity 
between 4% and 6% real.
12
  Our real risk free rate is given by the index-linked gilt 
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 We prefer to estimate the cost of equity directly, rather than estimate an equity risk premium.  The 
first reason is theoretical, in that as Jenkinson (1993) points out, the risk free terms in any CAPM need 
to be consistent.  Second, from an empirical standpoint, Wright et al (2003) argue against the separate 
estimation of the risk free rate and an equity risk premium on the grounds that estimates of the return 
on equities exhibit more stability than estimates of the equity risk premium. 
 14 
yield.  Finally, our real estimated cost of capital is converted to a nominal cost using 
the implied inflation rate estimated as described in footnote 11.   
 
Note that in any attempt to conduct an RIV valuation using forecasts, the estimates 
obtained are sensitive to both the cost of capital and the long run earnings growth 
assumptions used.  One can “reverse engineer” an RIV model to extract an implied 
cost of capital (as, for example, in Claus and Thomas, 2001) or even jointly estimate 
the cost of capital and implied growth, as in Easton (2006), although his model cannot 
be applied at the level of the individual firm.  Easton (2006) also notes that these 
estimates of cost of capital are sensitive to long run growth assumptions and this point 
will, of course, be equally valid in the calculation of any RIV model. 
   
As we note above, to impose the requirement that consensus analysts’ forecast be 
available reduces our sample considerably. Accordingly, we investigate an alternative, 
which simply involves assuming that for all firms the current year’s abnormal 
earnings grow in line with long run inflation and therefore have zero real growth.  As 
this makes the bland assumption that all firms have the same growth rates, we drop 
any industry specific cost of capital here, simply assuming a constant real cost of 
capital for all firms.  This model gives results that are qualitatively similar to our 
reported results (in fact, results are slightly stronger, which may be due to the absence 
of any mean reversion to an industry ROE).
13
   
 
Having obtained our firm specific estimate of value, itV̂ , we then calculate a price to 
theoretical valuation ratio, such that values of the ratio greater than unity imply firms 
are over-valued.  To avoid implausible values
14
, we Winsorise the price-to-value ratio 
at the 5% level.   
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 We also experimented with the forward earnings growth (FEG) model of Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth (2005), where short term growth is the consensus analyst’s forecast growth from year 1 to year 
2, and long run growth is based on industry ROE.  Unfortunately, this model turns out to be capable of 
yielding some fairly wild estimates of value, that even with Winsorisation look unrealistic.  We 
therefore dropped this model. 
 
14
 In particular, note that the RIV model can potentially give rise to negative valuations if residual 
income is sufficiently negative. 
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Finally, in order to test H1, we collect proxies for market-wide valuations.  We 
investigated several alternatives here, including the Financial Times All Share Index 
(FTASI) dividend yield, price earnings ratio, past 12 month return and a gilt-equity 
ratio calculated from the FTASI dividend yield (see Harris and Sanchez-Valle, 2000).  
Whilst all of these seem plausible proxies, a simple horse race indicates that the FTSE 
price-earnings ratio and the past 12-month return on the FTASI have better predictive 
power, for returns and form of financing respectively.  As control variables, we also 
include proxies for interest rates, and size and relative size of acquirer and target, all 
of which have been found to be important in explaining the form of financing.  
 
We test hypotheses H1, H5, H11, and H13 using a logistic regression model, although 
we also investigate H5, H11 and H13 using a simpler univariate approach.  H2, H3, 
H6 and H7 are tested directly by investigating buy and hold abnormal returns 
(BHARs) and test statistics based on Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999), with the addition 
of non-parametric tests for differences.  H4, H9, H10, H12 and H14 are addressed 
with simple univariate tests.  Finally, H8 is investigated using a treatment effects 
regression.   
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  We start with a brief description of 
summary statistics, and then move on to our univariate analyses.  This is followed by 
our analysis of pre-bid, announcement period and post-bid returns.  We then move on 
to our logit regression analyses and treatment effects regressions. Finally, we discuss 
further tests of the alternative Q-hypothesis.  Throughout our analysis, we footnote 
cases where our sensitivity analyses of SS1 and SS2 yield results that differ in terms 
of significance from those reported, but otherwise results from these sensitivity 
analysis sub-samples are qualitatively similar.  Full tabulated results for these sub-
samples are available from the authors on request. 
 
Results 
Summary statistics for our variables are reported in Table 2, where we partition the 
sample according to the form of bid financing.  The table shows the mean and 
standard deviation for each of the following variables: the acquirer’s announcement 
month return (acqar); the acquirer’s buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR) for 1 year 
(acq1bhar) and 3 years (acq3bhar) post acquisition; the acquirer’s pre-bid BHAR for 
 16 
1 year (acqp1bhar) and 3 years (acqp3bhar) pre-acquisition; the acquirer’s price to 
residual income valuation (RIV) ratio (acqprv); the acquirer’s book to market value 
(acqbtmv); the target’s announcement month return (tarar); the target’s pre-bid 
BHAR for 1 year (tarp1bhar) and 3 years (tarp3bhar) pre-acquisition; the target’s 
price to RIV ratio (tarprv); the target’s book to market value (tarbtmv);  a dummy 
variable (cong) equal to one if the acquisition is cross-industry, zero otherwise; the 
12-month pre-bid return on the FTASI (dmkt); the PE ratio on the FTASI (ftseper); 
the yield on long-dated index-linked gilts (indexyield);  the natural logarithm of the 
acquirer’s market capitalisation (lnacqcap); the natural logarithm of the market value 
of the target to the market value of the acquirer (logrelsize); the difference between 
long gilt yields and the Treasury Bill rate (longshort); and the relative price to value 
ratios of acquirer and target (overval), equal to acqprv divided by tarprv.   The final 
two columns show the differences between variables with the p-value from a two-
tailed t-test assuming unequal variances.  Significant differences are found between 
share financed and cash financed acquisitions with regard to acq3bhar, acqp1bhar, 
acqp3bhar, acqprv, acqbtmv, tarar, dmkt, lnaaccap, logrelsize and longshort 
variables.  We discuss more detailed tests for differences below, where we include 
non-parametric tests for differences, but in particular note that simple t-tests for 




For reasons of space, we do not report correlation matrices, but note that both one and 
three year BHARs are highly correlated, and that this is also the case for the pre-bid 
BHARs.  As would be expected, book-to-market ratios (our proxy for the inverse of 
Q) and our price to value ratio exhibits a significant negative correlation (-0.5).   
 
Simple Univariate Tests of Valuation and Method of Payment 
In Table 3, we examine the differences between the price to value ratios of acquirers 
and targets, separated between cash and equity deals, in order to test hypotheses H4, 
10 and 12.  We also compare the book to market value ratios (our proxy for Tobin’s 
Q) by type of financing.  Turning to the price to value (P/V) ratios, we see that, as 
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 Note one important feature of the SS1 and SS2 samples is that the size of the acquirer increases and 
the (negative) 3 year post acquisition BHAR decreases in absolute terms.  The former is consistent with 
some form of size bias in the availability of IBES forecasts, whereas the latter is consistent with some 
form of backfill or survivorship bias.  The fact that so many target forecasts are missing is also 
consistent with these two effects.  The problem seems particularly acute in the early years of our 
sample, which is worth bearing in mind when considering the results from our sensitivity analyses.   
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predicted by the SV hypothesis, the P/V ratio for acquirers, at a mean of 1.78 for the 
sample of equity acquirers, shows evidence of over-valuation and is substantially 
above the P/V ratio for targets, as expected under H12.  The t-test results show 
acquirers have a P/V ratio significantly greater than 1.0, and we see clear evidence 
that the P/V ratio for acquirers is significantly higher than that of the target in the case 
of equity bids, no matter whether a conventional t-test or a non-parametric Mann-
Whiney test is employed.  According to H4, valuation ratios should be greater for 
equity acquirers than cash acquirers, and this is indeed the case.  Note that the t-test 
for differences reported is the probability from a two-tailed test assuming unequal 
variances, so that if we wish to test whether H4 is supported the correct test 
probability is half that shown in the table.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 




Turning to H10, we fail to find any support for the SV hypothesis that targets are 
absolutely under-valued in the case of cash bids.  In fact, for both the equity and cash 
the sample groups in Table 3 the P/V ratio for the target is significantly greater than 1, 
and there is no evidence from the difference tests that targets are more lowly-valued 
in the case of cash deals, than equity deals. Under the Q-hypothesis the book to 
market difference should be significant for both cash and equity deals.  Whilst this is 
the case in the combined sample of bids, it only holds for the equity financing 
acquirers.  Cash acquirers have book to market ratios that fail to be significantly lower 
than those of their targets, something that is difficult to reconcile with Q-theory.  
There is also some evidence (though not from the non-parametric tests) that book to 
market ratios are lower in the case of equity-financing acquirers than cash-financing 
acquirers.
17
  Of course, one might rationalise this using Martin’s (1996) risk-sharing 
hypothesis if target book-to-value ratios were lower in such cases, but they are not. 
 
We can also test whether the propensity to use equity financing varies according to 
the P/V ratio of the acquirer or target, or their relative valuations, and this is our first 
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 Nonetheless, in SS2 the t-test difference fails to be significant at the 5% level, although the MW test 
shows the difference is significant.  However, given we are testing the acquirer’s valuation in H4, there 
is little reason to restrict the sample to cases where we have analysts’ forecasts for both acquirer and 
target.   
17
 Except in the case of sub-sample 2.  Note, though, that although we report sub-sample results for the 
purposes of comparison, there is no reason, when testing the Q-hypothesis, to restrict the sample size to 
cases where analysts’ forecasts are available for either acquirer or target. 
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test of hypotheses H5, H11 and H13.  We could simply split the sample into high and 
low valuation groups, but to do so would not recognise that if an acquirer is roughly 
correctly valued, management might be indifferent when it comes to the choice of 
financing.
18
  Accordingly, we split the sample into quantiles, choosing the Fama-
French breakpoints of 30% and 70% for P/V and relative over-valuation ratios.
19
  The 
results are reported in Table 4, where the lower quantile is the bottom 30% by P/V (or 
relative over-valuation) and the upper quantile is the top 30%.  The first two columns 
test for differences in target valuation and proportion of equity financed bids when 
P/V is defined using the acquirer’s P/V ratio, the next two columns test for differences 
in acquirer valuation and proportion of equity financing when the target’s P/V ratio is 
used to define the quantiles, and the final three columns show what happens when the 
relative over-valuation is used to define quantiles.  Again, the t-test probabilities are 
from two-tailed tests.  Target values are higher when acquirers are more highly 
valued, and the proportion of equity deals is higher when the bidder has a higher P/V 
ratio.
20
  This is consistent with H5.  Looking at relative over-valuation, we see 
evidence that equity financing is more likely when the acquirer is relatively over-
valued compared to the target, consistent with H13.  However, as is also clear from 
the central columns of the Table, there is no evidence that target valuation predicts the 
form of financing, which is inconsistent with H10 and H11.  For reasons of space, we 
do not repeat Table 4 using book-to-market ratios, but the results from doing so are 
similar to those reported, which seems more consistent with BMV being a proxy for 
over-valuation rather than investment opportunities. 
 
Tests for differences in  returns 
In Table 5 we test the SV predictions regarding pre and post bid abnormal returns. We 
start with pre-bid abnormal returns, reported in the first panel.  Tests for the BHARs 
being significantly different from zero are conducted using the Lyon et al (1999) 
bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic.  We see that pre-bid returns for acquirers 
overall are significantly positive at both 12 month and 36 month pre-bid horizons, and 
that returns for targets are negative at both horizons.
21
  These results are as one would 
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 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this point. 
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 In all but sub-sample 2 (where a one tailed t-test is only significant at 5.7%).  Again, though, there is 
no reason to require targets to have analysts’ forecasts when appraising acquirer valuation ratios. 
21
 Although the significance levels are marginal in the case of sub-sample 2 
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expect under either Q-theory or the SV hypothesis.  The critical difference between 
them is that under the SV hypothesis pre-bid returns will vary with the form of 
financing.  We see this is indeed the case.  Precisely as predicted by H2, pre-bid 
returns are strongly positive in the case of equity financing acquirers, with the mean 
pre-bid BHAR being 29.63% in the 12 months pre-bid for equity acquirers, and 
66.46% over the 36 months pre-bid.  Cash acquirers exhibit more modest 
outperformance, with a BHAR of 22.66% being significant over the 36 months pre-
bid.
22
  A Mann-Whitney test for differences
23
 shows equity financing acquirers have 
significantly higher pre-bid returns in both periods.  These results seem entirely 
consistent with the SV hypothesis.  However, the SV hypothesis also predicts (see 
H3) that targets in cash acquisitions will have negative pre-bid BHARs.  Whilst 
overall targets have negative returns, and cash acquirers have significant negative 12-
month BHARs, we see no reliable evidence that cash targets perform significantly 
worse than equity targets.  The conclusion is that whilst H2 is supported, H3 is not. 
 
So far, target valuations excepted, the majority of our results are supportive of the SV 
hypotheses, but as Dong et al (2006) point out, they could also be supportive of the Q-
theory of takeovers.  Under Q-theory, acquirers have higher market to book ratios (a 
proxy for Tobin’s Q) and higher pre-bid returns than targets because they are more 
efficiently managed.  As Q-theory is silent on the relationship between valuation and 
financing, fully distinguishing between these competing hypotheses implies that we 
need to look at post-announcement returns, and also to look more closely at the 
factors that influence the form of financing.  Accordingly, we now investigate these 
two issues. 
 
One way we can reliably distinguish between the Q hypothesis and the SV hypothesis 
is to examine the post-acquisition returns of bidding firms.  Under the SV hypothesis, 
equity financing acquirers would be expected to perform worse than cash financing 
acquirers.  By contrast, under the Q-hypothesis, it is presumably the case that either 
low Q acquirers should perform worse than their high-Q counterparts, or that 
relatively lowly-rated acquirers should perform worse.  Of course, if markets are 
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 In the sub-samples, equity-financing acquirer BHARs are always significant, but cash financing 
acquirer BHARs are not.   
23
 Given the statistical properties of BHARs, we do not report conventional t-tests for differences. 
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efficient, then this effect should appear at announcement.  But the SV hypothesis is 
quite explicitly a misvaluation hypothesis, and the authors specifically state that it is 
the long run returns that will be negative (p.305).  RKV also imply a concern with 
long run price corrections (p.2688).  Although we report short run announcement 
month returns, we concentrate on the longer run BHARs to examine the competing 
hypotheses.  We choose 1 year and 3 year BHARs simply because the years of our 
study (with acquisitions up to and including December 2004) do not allow the 
computation of full 5 years returns for the later years in our sample.     
 
In the second panel of Table 5 we report the overall mean acquirer announcement 
month return (acqar), and the target announcement month return (tarar) for each sub-
sample.  We again allow for non-normality in returns by using Lyon et al (1999) 
bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-tests and Mann-Whitney non-parametric tests for 
differences.  Under the Q-hypothesis, we would expect no difference in 
announcement month returns.  Under the SV hypothesis, it would be reasonable for 
markets to anticipate equity-financing signals an over-valuation.  Our results 
regarding target returns are in line with those from earlier studies (e.g. Draper and 
Paudyal, 1999) which show strong and significant  returns to target firms which are 
significantly greater in the case of cash bids.  For acquirers, abnormal returns are 
negative in the case of equity deals, but not significantly so.
24
  The 1.06% difference 
in returns between equity and cash acquirers fails to be significant at conventional 
levels unless one is prepared to accept a one-tailed t-test for the significance of equity 
returns being less than those from cash at the 10% level.   
 
Of course, the SV hypothesis is concerned with predicting long run returns not short 
run returns, so we now turn to those results in the final panel of Table 5.  Perhaps not 
surprisingly, given the long history of research into bidder returns (see, for example, 
Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000) we see that overall returns are significantly negative at both 
horizons with the one year post bid returns being -6.84% and the three year post bid 
returns being -15.41%.  For equity acquirers, the 12-monnth BHAR is a significant  
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 However, equity acquirer returns are significantly negative in the case of sub-sample 1, as are 
differences in returns between equity and cash acquirers.   
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-8.21% and the 36 month BHAR is a significant -20.18%.  At both these horizons the 
returns to cash acquirers are negative but not different from zero.
25
  Differences 
between cash and equity acquirer BHARs are significant at the 36-month (although 
not at the 12-month horizon), with the difference being 13.82%.  This is a major 
challenge to Q-theory, as it is hard to reconcile long run bidder returns that are 
negative overall, with the return depending on the form of financing, with that 
theory’s predictions.  By contrast, consistent with the SV hypothesis the results 
support H6, although they do not support H7 as cash acquisitions do not show returns 




Our last test in this section is our first pass at investigating the specific prediction of 
the SV model (p.305) that relatively over-valued acquirers undertake equity-financed 
acquisitions of relatively less over-valued targets, and that this is in the long-run 
interests of shareholders.  Accordingly, in Table 6, we report the results for equity-
financed acquisitions, after partitioning on the basis of relative values.  An acquirer is 
relatively over-valued if its price-to-value ratio is greater than that of the target, and 
relatively under-valued otherwise.  Rather than partition solely on the basis of a 
simple over or under valuation criterion, we report the results for varying degrees of 
over or under valuation.  In the Table, the “Over by >x%” columns show the results 
where acquirers are relatively over-valued compared to the targets, and the “Under by 
>x%” columns show cases where the acquirers are relatively under-valued compared 
to targets.  The first three columns show the results for the sample of acquisitions and 
mergers where over / under valuation is defined by a simple partition into “over” and 
“under” valued categories; the following three show the results for the sample of 
acquisitions for which acquirers are relatively over valued by 10% or relatively under-
valued by 10%; and the final three show the results for the sample of acquisitions for 
which acquirers are relatively over valued by 20% or relatively under-valued by 
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 They are positive (though not significantly so) in the case of sub-samples 1 and 2. 
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 We also test whether returns vary according to whether returns vary by either the acquirer book-to-
market ratio or the relative book-to-market valuation ratio.  There is no evidence of any difference.    
We do not report these results as the lack of any significant differences provides no evidence one way 





  Of course, if the SV hypothesis is strictly correct, we should see no firms 
using equity financing if they are not relatively over valued.  Table 6 shows the 
acquirer’s announcement period and long run returns, together with the target’s 
announcement period return.  In no cases do the acquirer announcement period returns 
vary significantly between the two groups.  Turning to the long run BHARs, both 12 
month and 36 month BHARs are always worse for the group that should not, 
according to SV, have used equity financing, but whilst all the BHARs are 
significantly negative for this “relatively under-valued” group, no matter how the 
sample is partitioned, the differences always fail to be significant, although it is worth 
remembering that because of the skewed nature of BHARs, all our difference tests 
employ a non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test, which will lack power to reject the 
null hypothesis.    However, as we move across columns in the Table to progressively 
greater degrees of relative over/under valuation, we see that the “SV rational” group 
of equity issues (i.e. those that are relatively over-valued) experience less negative 
BHARs at the 12-month horizon.  Indeed, for the 20% relatively over-valued group, 
the 12-month BHAR is not significant.  Whilst there is a hint of support for the SV 
hypothesis here in the 12-month returns, there is no convincing evidence for H8 or 
H14 as after 36 months all BHARs are significantly negative. Furthermore, as we 
argue later, a more robust methodology is needed to test this hypothesis.  Before 
leaving the discussion of this Table, we note an intriguing difference in target returns 
between the sub-groups.  Announcement period returns to targets are far greater when 
the acquirer is relatively over-valued compared to the target than when it is not, and 
this effect is robust across all the alternative relative valuation cut-offs.  To some 
degree, this may be consistent with the SV claim that acquirer buys-off a target 
management, who might infer that the acquirer is relatively highly valued and so 
require a better exchange ratio to accept the deal.  
 
Logit regression tests of acquisition financing 
In keeping with the Dong et al (2006) and Ang and Cheng (2006) studies we 
undertake a logit regression analysis to analyse the method of payment.  Above, we 
have examined univariate tests, which are helpful in shedding some light on the 
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 We also partition using a 30% over/under valuation, where the sample consists of 206 relatively 
over-valued and 90 under-valued firms, and also by using the 30/70 quantile cut-offs described in Table 
4.  The results are qualitatively identical to those reported for the 20% over/under valued cut-off. 
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financing decision, but a more rigorous method of testing the form of consideration is 
to run a logistic regression on the method of payment, where the dependent variable is 
equity financing.  We test the SV hypothesis relating to market-wide metrics using 
two alternative proxies for market values, the past 12-month market return term, dmkt, 
and the FTASI PE ratio.
28
  Our other market timing variable is designed to pick up the 
effect of the underlying real interest rate, as measured by the difference between long 
and short risk free interest rates, longshort.  We also control for the log of the relative 
size of acquirer and target. We test several versions of the model.  First, we simply 
include the acquirer and target P/V ratios.  Second, we use the three quantile groups 
(bottom 30% by P/V [Group 1]; mid 40%; top  30% by P/V [Group 3]) defined earlier 
as way of avoiding the influence of any outliers on the regression.  Third, we 
specifically model the effects of relative valuation using the relative valuation ratio.  
We examine this using both a simple relative over-valuation dummy, reloveral, equal 
to one if the acquirer is relatively over-valued compared to the target, and by using the 
three quantile groups for the degree of over-valuation.  Last, we investigate whether 
the book-to-market ratio forecasts financing choice.  Under Q-theory, once market 
and size variables have been allowed for, we argue that the acquirer’s book to market 
ratio should not influence the form of financing. 
 
For reasons of space, we do not report regressions using the FTSASI PER, as they 
have marginally lower explanatory power than those that employ the dmkt variable.  
The results using the latter proxy for market-wide valuations are reported in Table 7. 
The significant variables are the prior 12 month return on the market (consistent with 
H1), the long minus short interest rate, the log of relative size, and the acquirer P/V 
ratio.  The target P/V ratio is simply not significant.  The results when valuation is 
defined by group are very similar, suggesting that the significance of acquirer P/V is 
not driven by outliers.  For the relative valuation model, we see that irrespective of 
whether a dummy variable or a grouping variable is used to define relative over-
valuation, relative over-valuation is a significant predictor of the likelihood of equity 
financing.  Last, in the final two columns of the Table, we see that this result, that 
price-value predicts financing, carries across to BMV.  This seems consistent with 
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 As discussed earlier, we also tested our model using the dividend yield on the index and the gilt-
equity yield ratio, with similar but weaker results. 
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BMV being a proxy for over-valuation rather than the investment opportunity set.
29
  





Tests of long run acquirer performance contingent on the decision to issue equity 
The above findings clearly show that market timing variables, acquirer valuation and 
relative valuation ratios, together with variables capturing the size of acquirers and 
targets are important determinants of the acquirer’s financing decision. Neither the 
Ang and Chen (2006) nor the Dong et al (2006) papers investigate the long run 
performance of equity acquirers relative to cash acquirers.  Yet as we noted earlier 
this matter would seem to be critically important in assessing the SV hypothesis.  
Under the SV hypothesis, we would expect under-performance of equity acquirers 
relative to that of cash acquirers, but the acquisition itself represents the rational 
exploitation of over-valued equity by the acquirer’s management.   
 
It is tempting to run a regression to try and detect any abnormal performance, either in 
the form of two regressions for the equity and cash sub-samples, or one regression 
with a dummy variable for shares.  Indeed, if we run the latter model we find that 
shares is a significant explanatory variable, implying that issuing equity has a 
negative impact on post bid returns.  The only other variable with power to predict 36 
month BHARs are the FTSE PE ratio.  Unfortunately, it turns out that an OLS 
regression approach to assessing the impact of equity issuance is incorrect.  For 
example, Greene (2000, pp 933-4) shows that if we try to estimate the regression: 
 iiii SxR εδβ ++′= , 
Where Ri is a measure of abnormal returns and Si is a dummy variable=1 if the 
takeover is financed by equity, in general the OLS estimate of Si will over-state the 
effect of an equity offering because of self-selection bias. The managers that select 
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 Using SS1, we obtain largely similar results, but with one important caveat, which is that consistent 
with H11 the target P/V ratio becomes a weakly significant negative predictor of equity financing when 
valuation ratios are defined using groups.  Past market returns also have a weaker role to play when 
absolute, rather than relative, valuation models are employed.  In all cases, the pseudo R-squared ratio 
improves considerably and most strikingly of all, acquirer P/V and the relative valuation ratios are now 
significant at the 1% level.  For SS2, pseudo R-squared shows a further marginal increase, and the 
acquirer and relative valuation metrics are again significant at the 1% level.  Target P/V ratios now 
exhibit no significance at conventional levels however, and dmkt loses its significance. 
 
30
 Except in the SS1 sample.  See FN 29. 
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equity may do so because of factors that were expected to influence returns, such as 
over-valuation.  The correct approach here is to model the decision on financing using 
a first stage probit model, and then form a selectivity correction term (or “hazard” 
function), λi, which is incorporated in a second-stage OLS regression (Maddala, 1983; 
Greene, 2000, p.934), known as a “treatment effects” model.  Alternatively, we can 
adopt a maximum likelihood (ML) approach.  We follow the latter procedure and run 
the model using the ML treatment effects procedure available in Stata, which allows 
us to use a Huber/White/sandwich estimator of the variance.
31
  For the first stage 
model we use as predictors the variables used in the logistic regression.  In the 
second-stage regression we employ the 36 month BHARs.  The point here is that if 
SV are correct, and managers are issuing equity in response to over-valuation, once 
that valuation is taken into account then the coefficient on shares should not be 
significant.  We also include proxies for market-wide conditions (we use the same 
variables outlined before, but find the best predictor of future returns is the FTSE PE 
ratio) and interest rates (again, we try alternative proxies but find the index linked gilt 
yield has the best explanatory power).  We include the target announcement period 
return, as a simple test on whether over-payment influences the outcome (dropping 
this variable makes no qualitative difference to our results), a measure of acquirer size 
(the log of the acquirer’s market capitalisation, lnacqcap), and a dummy variable for 
conglomerate mergers as a direct test of H9.  We also investigated the effect of 
including relative size in our second stage regression, but as it was never significant 
we do not report results that include this variable. 
 
The results are shown in Table 8.  We report results for the sample using both 
absolute and relative P/V metrics, and also report results using our quantile versions 
of these two variables, giving four alternative models in all.  The tables show the 
second stage, or augmented regressions, the results from the first stage probit (which, 
as one would expect, are similar to those from the logit model), the selectivity 
correction term, lambda, and two Wald tests.  The first reports a Wald test of whether 
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 A particular difficulty when using BHARs as the dependent variable in regression tests of any type is 
the problem of influential observations.  BHARs are both skewed and exhibit leptokurtosis.  We are 
therefore careful to estimate our regressions, in the simple OLS and in all subsequent regressions, using 
a Huber/White/sandwich estimator of the variance.  An alternative method of dealing with the 
skewness and kurtosis in the BHARs is Winsorising the 36-month BHARs.  Winsorising at 5% gets rid 
of most of the skewness and kurtosis and leads to more significant regressions, strengthening the 
significance of the “shares” term. 
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the error terms from the first and second term regressions are correlated.  The second 
Wald Test is a test of whether all the terms in the second stage regression are jointly 
significant.  We note that in contrast to the simple OLS results, the shares variable is 
no longer significant once valuation effects are considered.  No matter which 
specification of the first stage model is employed, only two factors now appear to 
predict returns – the market-wide PE ratio, which has a positive coefficient, and size, 
which also has a positive coefficient.  Clearly cong has no role to play in explaining 
returns, and neither did it do so in a simple OLS regression, so we can reasonably 
conclude that H9 is not supported. The second Wald test shows that the terms 
(excluding the constant) in the second stage regression are not jointly equal to zero. 
Ironically, though, the first Wald test shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
the two equations are independent.  The fact that shares now has a coefficient not 
significantly different from zero provides some comfort for the SV hypothesis, but the 
fact that the two equations are not significantly independent falls some way short of 
convincingly supporting H8.
32
   
 
Further tests of the alternative Q-hypothesis 
We undertook several further tests to check whether the Q-hypothesis had any power 
in explaining long run returns.  We do not report the relevant tables for space reasons, 
but simply summarise the results.  First, we tested 36-month BHARs of the upper and 
lower quantiles of acquirers by book to market category, where quantiles were 
established as described in Table 4.  Both quantile groups had significant negative 
BHARs that were almost identical to one another.  We next separated acquirers into 
quantile groups according to the relative book to market of the acquirer and target, 
with similar results.  Our final tests employed OLS regressions, similar to those 
described above, but excluding a shares term.
33
 If the Q-hypothesis is correct, we 
might observe a negative relationship between book to market, or relative book to 
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 For models based on SS1, results are generally very weak. For models based  on SS2, we find the 
following differences.  First, size if no longer a significant predictor of return, but the target 
announcement period return has an economically and statistically significant impact on shareholder 
returns.  Every one percent increase in target returns decreases the 36 month BHAR by around 0.32%.  
The positive relation between the FTSE PE ratio and BHAR remains, and the coefficient on shares 
now falls to a negligible amount.  Where the simple OLS regression estimates suggested a significant 
impact on BHAR of -18.7%, the augmented regressions show a much reduced effect.  The maximum 
impact (when relative over-valuation is used in the first stage regression) is an insignificant -4.4%.   
33
 As there is nothing in Q-theory to suggest that form of financing should be associated with returns, 
there is no theoretical reason to run a treatment effects model. 
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market, and return, as low book to market firms are those with managerial skill and 
the best growth opportunities in theory.  In fact, we find a positive but not significant 
association between acquirer book to market and relative book-to-market.  In addition, 
we find acquirer size and the FTASI PE ratio are positively associated with BHAR, 
but target announcement period return has a negative association. 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we have explored the SV and Q hypotheses of takeovers using a new 
sample taken from a market that has not so far been subject to a test of the SV 
hypothesis.  Most of our findings are broadly supportive of the SV market-driven 
theory of takeovers.  Proxies for acquirer over-valuation seems to increase the 
probability of an equity offer, even after market timing and relative size effects have 
been allowed for. “Over-valued” acquirers also tend to buy “over-valued” targets. Our 
finding that acquirers are more highly valued than their targets adds support to the SV 
hypothesis, but is also consistent with the Q-hypothesis.  We also find that the pre-bid 
returns for equity acquirers are significantly higher than those for cash acquirers, a 
result predicted by SV, and some evidence that cash targets have underperformed pre-
bid.  However, we do not find any evidence that cash targets perform significantly 
less well pre-bid than equity targets, and this is not consistent with the SV predictions.  
Of course, this result that targets under-perform whilst acquirers out-perform is 
entirely consistent with Q-theory, but that theory does not predict that pre-bid returns 
vary by form of financing.  That said, one can argue that particularly successful firms 
may have exhausted their free cash flow on other growth opportunities, in which case 
these findings would not amount to a rejection of Q-theory. 
 
We argue that the best way of distinguishing between the SV and Q hypotheses is to 
examine long run returns, since SV specifically predict that these should be negative 
for equity financing acquirers, although not as negative as they would have been if the 
acquisition had not taken place.  By contrast, the Q-hypothesis would predict that long 
run returns should either be positive or at worst, zero.  We find that for equity-
financed takeovers long-run abnormal returns are significantly negative, whilst for 
cash acquirers the returns are not significantly different from zero.    We also partition 
the sub-sample of equity acquirers according to whether or not they were relatively 
over-valued.  According to SV, only relatively over-valued acquirers would undertake 
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an equity financed merger.  Whilst the relatively over-valued group have better 
performance, the difference is not significant. 
 
Central to the SV hypothesis is the notion that over-valued acquirers exploit their 
over-valuation to buy less over-valued targets.  Our main test of this is conducted 
using logit regressions.  Here, the evidence in favour of the SV hypothesis is robust 
and in line with that from the US investigations.  We see clear evidence that highly 
valued acquirers and relatively highly valued acquirers are significantly more likely to 
use equity financing.  However, there is limited evidence that under valued targets are 
more likely to attract cash bids. 
 
Given our finding that the form of financing can be predicted by valuation related 
variables, we argue that a treatment effects model should be used in any subsequent 
analysis of long-run abnormal returns.  There is some support for the SV proposition 
that managers of over-valued firms may be acting rationally in buying relatively 
under-valued targets for equity, but we are unable to demonstrate strong support for 
this.  Using a different methodology, our results here are in some contrast with the US 
findings from Ang and Cheng (2006) and Savor and Lu (2009).  
 
Whilst our results are generally consistent with the SV hypothesis, and by extension 
are supportive of the RKV model, there are some results that are not consistent with 
SV.  First, except in some versions of the logit model, we are unable to detect that 
variation in the value of target firms has any consistent significant influence on the 
probability of an equity offer.  This result differs from that of Ang and Cheng (2006) 
and Dong et al (2006). Second, we can reject the SV prediction that conglomerate 
mergers may have higher returns than industry related mergers. We should also note 
the SV predictions that we do not test.  First, we do not test any of their predictions 
relating to merger waves.  Neither do we test predictions relating to target resistance.  
Finally, we do not test whether acquirers exhibit other features of over-valuation.  In 
particular, SV highlight earnings management and director share sales.  There is 
evidence that UK firms manage earnings ahead of equity financed deals (Botsari and 
Meeks, 2008).  An analysis of directors’ dealing before bids would also shed some 
light on whether directors are knowingly exploiting mis-valuation, as predicted by the 
SV hypothesis, or whether they are simply over-confident.  In this regard, Malmendier 
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and Tate (2008) provide interesting evidence of over-confidence amongst acquiring 
firm CEOs.  As an anonymous referee has pointed out, a plausible explanation of our 
results might be that over-valued firms are simply firms with a strong price run up, 
and that the managers in those firms are likely to suffer from hubris.  They will 
finance bids with equity to conserve financial slack.  Given we find a significant 
correlation between prior abnormal returns and over-valuation, and (in unreported 
logit tests) we find that prior returns also have predictive power in explaining the 
decision to acquire using equity, most of our results that support the SV hypothesis 
can be also interpreted as being consistent with this alternative “hubris”-type 
hypothesis.  The only way that we can see of testing this is to examine the trading 
activity of the acquiring firm’s directors.  SV specifically predict that there will be 
evidence of stock selling by insiders in over-valued firms that finance bids by equity.  
This test of the hubris hypothesis versus the SV hypothesis is a matter worthy of 
detailed investigation in its own right, and we leave that for future research. 
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Table 1:  Acquirer Size and book to market (BTMV) details 
Each year from 1985 to 2004, all firms recorded in LSPD are sorted on their market 
capitalisation in descending order, and are used to classify all our acquiring firms into 
10 size deciles, deciles 1 contains largest firms, while deciles 10 contains the smallest 
firms. Acquirers are assigned into their appropriate size deciles according to their 
individual market capitalisation at the beginning of the year of acquisition.  We also 
collect all the book-to-market values (BTMV) for all the firms recorded on LSPD 
each year from 1985—2004 for which book-to-market ratios are available on 
DataStream, and divide all the firms with positive BTMV ratios into 5 groups, with 
Group A containing the lowest BTMV ratio firms (“growth or glamour firms”), and 
Group E contains the highest BTMV ratio firms (“value” firms). Our acquiring firms 
are allocated into the appropriate BTMV group in each year based upon their end June 
BTMV ratios.  All firms with negative BTMV ratio are assigned into a separate 
group.  Distributions of the acquiring firms are shown below. 
 
 
Size Decile Whole 
sample 
% Shares % Cash % 
Large, 1 213 31.8% 111 25.3% 102 44.2% 
2 105 15.7% 64 14.6% 41 17.7% 
3 93 13.9% 64 14.6% 29 12.6% 
4 78 11.7% 60 13.7% 18 7.8% 
5 41 6.1% 35 8.0% 6 2.6% 
6 38 5.7% 28 6.4% 10 4.3% 
7 46 6.9% 37 8.4% 9 3.9% 
8 32 4.8% 20 4.6% 12 5.2% 
9 16 2.4% 13 3.0% 3 1.3% 
Small, 10 7 1.0% 6 1.4% 1 0.4% 
Total 669 100.0% 438 100.0% 231 100.0% 
 
BTMV Quintile Whole  
sample 
% Shares % Cash % 
Low, A 211 31.5% 152 34.7% 59 25.5% 
B 139 20.8% 102 23.3% 37 16.0% 
C 99 14.8% 70 16.0% 29 12.6% 
D 96 14.3% 50 11.4% 46 19.9% 
High, E 116 17.3% 61 13.9% 55 23.8% 
Negative 8 1.2% 3 0.7% 5 2.2% 
Total 669 100.00% 438 100.0% 231 100.0% 





Table 2: Summary Statistics. The table shows summary statistics (mean and 
standard deviation) for each of the following variables: the acquirer’s announcement 
month return (acqar); the acquirer’s buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR) for 1 year 
(acq1bhar) and 3 years (acq3bhar) post acquisition; the acquirer’s pre-bid BHAR for 
1 year (acqp1bhar) and 3 years (acqp3bhar) pre-acquisition; the acquirer’s price to 
residual income valuation (RIV) ratio (acqprv); the acquirer’s book to market value 
(acqbtmv); the target’s announcement month return (tarar); the target’s pre-bid 
BHAR for 1 year (tarp1bhar) and 3 years (tarp3bhar) pre-acquisition; the target’s 
price to RIV ratio (tarprv); the target’s book to market value (tarbtmv);  a dummy 
variable (cong) equal to one if the acquisition is cross-industry, zero otherwise; the 
12-month pre-bid return on the FTASI (dmkt); the PE ratio on the FTASI (ftseper); 
the yield on long-dated index-linked gilts (indexyield);  the natural logarithm of the 
acquirer’s market capitalisation (lnacqcap); the natural logarithm of the market value 
of the target to the market value of the acquirer (logrelsize); the difference between 
long gilt yields and the Treasury Bill rate (longshort); and the relative price to value 
ratios of acquirer and target (overval), equal to acqprv divided by tarprv.  The “Diffs” 
column shows differences between share financed and cash financed acquisition, and 
the T-test p-values in the final column are probabilities from t-tests assuming unequal 
variances. 
  









No. obs 231 438 669 (p-value) 
acqar 0.001 -0.009 -0.006 0.01 
 (0.10) (0.13) (0.12) (0.24) 
acq1bhar -0.042 -0.082 -0.068 0.04 
 (0.35) (0.39) (0.38) (0.18) 
acq3bhar -0.064 -0.202 -0.154 0.138 
 (0.74) (0.82) (0.80) (0.03) 
acqp1bhar 0.065 0.296 0.217 -0.231 
 (0.76) (1.62) (1.39) (0.01) 
acqp3bhar 0.227 0.665 0.513 -0.438 
 (1.92) (2.06) (2.02) (0.01) 
acqprv 1.559 1.78 1.704 -0.221 
 (1.40) (1.48) (1.45) (0.06) 
acqbtmv 0.635 0.553 0.582 0.082 
 (0.59) (0.58) (0.58) (0.09) 
tarar 0.248 0.202 0.218 0.046 
 (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) (0.06) 
tarp1bhar -0.107 -0.103 -0.105 -0.004 
 (0.46) (0.58) (0.54) (0.92) 
tarp3bhar -0.224 -0.196 -0.206 -0.028 
 (1.57) (1.47) (1.50) (0.82) 
tarprv 1.271 1.296 1.288 -0.025 
 (0.80) (0.84) (0.83) (0.70) 
tarbtmv 0.691 0.672 0.678 0.019 
 (0.58) (0.53) (0.54) (0.67) 
cong 0.429 0.402 0.411 0.027 
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 (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.51) 
dmkt 0.127 0.175 0.158 -0.048 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.00) 
ftseper 17.827 17.719 17.756 0.108 
 (5.34) (4.86) (5.03) (0.80) 
indexyield 0.032 0.033 0.033 -0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) 
lnacqcap 5.738 4.723 5.074 1.015 
 (2.04) (1.97) (2.05) (0.00) 
logrelsize -0.962 -0.483 -0.648 -0.479 
 (0.76) (0.63) (0.71) (0.00) 
longshort -0.61 -0.276 -0.391 -0.334 
 (1.84) (1.66) (1.73) (0.02) 
overval 1.641 1.754 1.715 -0.113 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 4: Tests for differences between upper and lower quantile groups.  The 
Table shows the differences in valuation ratios and propensity to issue shares, with 
quantiles based on the following variables: the acquirer’s price to residual income 
valuation (RIV) ratio (acqprv); the target’s price to RIV ratio (tarprv); and the 
acquirer’s RIV divided by the target’s RIV (overval).  Upper and lower quantiles are 




 centiles.  The t-tests following the “differences” 
rows show the probabilities from two-tailed tests (assuming unequal variances) of a 
test that the difference is zero.  Number of observations is 669 acquisitions. 
 
Defining variable acprv acprv tarprv tarprv overval overval overval 
Test variable tarprv shares acqprv shares acqprv tarprv shares 
Lower Quantile 0.924 0.602 1.247 0.642 0.858 1.758 0.577 
Upper Quantile 1.657 0.705 2.210 0.655 3.047 0.994 0.660 
Difference 0.733 0.103 0.963 0.013 2.189 -0.764 0.083 
t-test 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.782 0.000 0.000 0.088 
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Table 5. BHAR tests of pre-acquisition, announcement and post-bid returns for 
acquirers and targets.  The table shows the buy and hold abnormal returns for each 
of the following variables: the acquirer’s pre-bid BHAR for 1 year (acqp1bhar) and 3 
years (acqp3bhar) pre-acquisition; the target’s pre-bid BHAR for 1 year (tarp1bhar) 
and 3 years (tarp3bhar) pre-acquisition; the acquirer’s announcement month return 
(acqar) and the target’s announcement month return (tarar); and the acquirer’s buy 
and hold abnormal return (BHAR) for 1 year (acq1bhar) and 3 years (acq3bhar) post 
acquisition. The p-values following the BHAR rows show the probabilities from the 
Lyon et al (1999) bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-test that the BHAR is zero.  The 
p-values in the differences column show the probability from a non-parametric Mann-
Whitney test of the difference being zero.   
 
 
Financing All Stock Cash Difference: 
Stock - Cash 
No. Obs. 669 438 231  
     
Pre-bid returns 
acqp1bhar 21.65% 29.63% 6.53% 23.11% 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.123 0.005 
acqp3bhar 51.33% 66.46% 22.66% 43.80% 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.002 
tarp1bhar -10.46% -10.32% -10.73% 0.41% 
p-value 0.002 0.031 0.004 0.415 
tarp3bhar -20.59% -19.62% -22.44% 2.82% 
p-value 0.006 0.013 0.381 0.205 
     
Announcement Period Returns 
acqar -0.58% -0.94% 0.12% -1.06% 
p-value 0.215 0.128 0.856 0.157 
tarar 21.80% 20.24% 24.76% -4.52% 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.025 
     
Post bid Returns 
acq1bhar -6.84% -8.21% -4.24% -3.96% 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.125 0.291 
acq3bhar -15.41% -20.18% -6.37% -13.82% 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Logistic regression tests based upon valuation ratios.  This Table reports 
the results of logistic regressions with dependent variable “Shares”, a dummy variable 
equal to one if the acquisition is financed by equity, zero if the acquisition is for cash.  
Independent variables are: the 12-month pre-bid return on the FTASI (dmkt); the 
difference between long gilt yields and the Treasury Bill rate (longshort); the natural 
logarithm of the market value of the target to the market value of the acquirer 
(logrelsize); the acquirer’s price to residual income valuation (RIV) ratio (acqprv); the 
target’s price to RIV ratio (tarprv); a dummy variable (reloverval) equal to one if the 
acquirer’s RIV to market value ratio is greater than that of the target; the acquirer’s 
book to market value (acqbtmv); the target’s book to market value (tarbtmv);  and the 
intercept term (_cons).  In addition, valuation ratios for acquirer and target (acqvalgp 
and tarvalgp respectively) and overvaluation (overvalgp) are defined on the basis of 









dmkt 2.31 2.304 2.4 2.429 2.321 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
longshort 0.194 0.188 0.19 0.187 0.193 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
logrelsize 1.168 1.166 1.178 1.161 1.182 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
acqprv 0.148         
 (0.029)         
tarprv -0.075         
 (0.507)         
acqvalgp   0.282       
   (0.023)       
tarvalgp   -0.125       
   (0.311)       
reloverval     0.459     
     (0.011)     
overvalgp       0.252   
       (0.029)   
acqbtmv         -0.347 
         (0.022) 
tarbtmv         -0.025 
         (0.883) 
_cons 1.06 0.899 0.945 0.686 1.443 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) 
Pseudo R2 0.124 0.124 0.125 0.123 0.124 
LR Chi2 and P-
value 
-377.911 -377.744 -377.17 -378.01 -377.605 





Table 8.  Maximum likelihood treatment effects model of financing choice, with 
regression dependent variable the acquiring firm’s 36-month BHAR. 
The first panel shows the results from the treatment model augmented regression from 
Maddala (1983) with the additional panels showing the first stage probit results from 
this process, together with the hazard or selectivity correction.  Estimation is 
conducted using the 2-stage estimator in Stata.  Independent variables in the second 
stage augmented regression are: the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s market 
capitalisation (lnacqcap); the target’s announcement month return (tarar); the PE 
ratio on the FTASI (ftseper); a dummy variable (cong) equal to one if the acquisition 
is cross-industry, zero otherwise; a dummy variable equal to one if the acquisition is 
financed by equity (shares): the yield on long-dated index-linked gilts (indexyield); 
and _cons, the intercept term.  Independent variables in the first stage probit are: the 
12-month pre-bid return on the FTASI (dmkt); the difference between long gilt yields 
and the Treasury Bill rate (longshort); the natural logarithm of the market value of the 
target to the market value of the acquirer (logrelsize); the acquirer’s price to residual 
income valuation (RIV) ratio (acqprv); the target’s price to RIV ratio (tarprv); a 
dummy variable (reloverval) equal to one if the acquirer’s RIV to market value ratio 
is greater than that of the target; the acquirer’s book to market value (acqbtmv); the 
target’s book to market value (tarbtmv);  and the intercept term (_cons).  In addition, 
valuation ratios for acquirer and target (acqvalgp and tarvalgp respectively) and 
overvaluation (overvalgp) are defined on the basis of groups (see Table 5) where 








Treatment model augmented regression 
lnacqcap 0.041 0.040 0.039 0.039 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.031) (0.023) 
tarar -0.147 -0.149 -0.151 -0.150 
 (0.129) (0.119) (0.113) (0.117) 
ftseper 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 
 (0.029) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) 
cong -0.051 -0.052 -0.052 -0.052 
 (0.416) (0.413) (0.413) (0.414) 
indexlkyield 5.430 5.620 5.741 5.631 
 (0.327) (0.314) (0.309) (0.314) 
shares -0.048 -0.083 -0.103 -0.084 
 (0.819) (0.693) (0.672) (0.697) 
_cons -0.789 -0.771 -0.761 -0.770 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022) 
First stage probit regression 
dmkt 1.345 1.332 1.379 1.408 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
longshort 0.115 0.111 0.113 0.112 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
logrelsize 0.694 0.693 0.701 0.693 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
acqprv 0.089    
 (0.034)    
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tarprv -0.050    
 (0.468)    
acqvalgp  0.165   
  (0.028)   
tarvalgp  -0.077   
  (0.303)   
reloverval   0.277  
   (0.010)  
overvalgp    0.156 
    (0.024) 
_cons 0.642 0.553 0.571 0.406 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.013) 
Selectivity correction 
lambda -0.043 -0.019 -0.005 -0.018 
Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0) 0.100 0.020 0.000 0.020 
 (0.746) (0.885) (0.969) (0.892) 
Wald chi2 test for sig. of augmented regression 23.070 23.250 23.060 23.140 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
 
